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overall health expenditure or social spending and studies examining the effect of single regulatory measures on NH outcomes.
| The role of political control at the executive and legislative levels
The effect of political control of the legislature on outcomes has been empirically tested by exploiting the variation across US states and internationally by exploiting the variation across OECD countries. Democratic control results in higher budget totals, tax burdens, and welfare spending than Republican control. [4] [5] [6] [7] Similarly, cross-country research reveals that leftist governments increase overall social spending, [8] [9] [10] although two studies document a weakening of this relationship in the 1990s. 11, 12 Empirical evidence on the role and importance of the governor is mixed. Lewis et al 13 and Barrilleaux and Berkman 14 present evidence that governors play a significant role in pursuing redistributive policies, while Reed 7 and Ferguson 15 do not find support for this hypothesis. However, considering that the executive officer's formal power is often limited and a veto can be overruled by a legislative supermajority in all states, it is likely that the political control wielded by the governor affects NHs to a lesser extent than political control of the legislative chambers.
| How political control affects Medicaid's longterm care services
Although Medicaid primarily covers acute care, 25.0% of its budget was spent on long-term care in 2014. 16 Medicaid's $118.7 billion long-term care budget represents more than one-third of NHs' revenues. 17 Unlike Medicare, which is a national health insurance program that is solely administered and funded by the federal government, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that is administered by the states. The state programs have to conform to federal guidelines in order for the state to receive matching funds and grants. However, with increasing state discretion over the past 50 years, state governments are now the most important decision makers with regard to eligibility, reimbursement, and the provision of care in Medicaid long-term care programs. 18 Changes in Medicaid regulations are shaped at the state level through the legislative process. In all US states except Nebraska,* the legislative procedure resembles the federal process. After a bill is introduced, it must pass both legislative chambers, that is, the House and the Senate. During this cumbersome process, the bill is debated and modified if necessary. Bills can die by failing to gain a majority in the subcommittees, through gatekeeping by the chair, 19 or due to filibuster. 20 After the debate in the legislature, the bill must be signed by the two presiding chairs and, depending on the state, by the governor. In some states, the constitution allows for a gubernatorial veto that can be overruled by the two chambers with a supermajority. 21 Politicians' political party plays a significant role in defining
Medicaid eligibility criteria and benefit coverage. 22 NHs' revenues can be managed through changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates and Medicaid eligibility, and the provision of care is sensitive to the reimbursement structure. 23 Effort and expenses can be deliberately influenced by imposing regulatory requirements, such as minimum staffing ratios, 24 wage pass-through laws, 25 care guidelines, staff education regulations, 26, 27 and documentation requirements. 28 In addition to directly influencing revenue and expenses, the acting government may issue mandates to improve resident outcomes by strengthening public reporting, 29, 30 altering the regulatory process or implementing practice guidelines. 31 State governments frequently use their power and their instruments to shape the delivery of care. In 2015, 31 collected a resident bed tax, 37 had a bed-hold policy in place that awards a reduced rate for holding a bed while a resident is in the hospital, and 12 states granted wage pass-through payments to increase wages and benefits for direct-care staff.
| Nursing homes' responses to a changing political environment
In order to optimize overall business performance, NH managers align their engagement in their main business segments, that is, Medicaid, Medicare, and private-pay services, with the political and regulatory environment. In case of revenue losses in the Medicaid segment, managers stabilize revenues and profit margins by targeting higher-margin Medicare and private-pay residents more intensely 32, 33 or by restricting access for high-need, high-cost, but low-profit residents, for example, dual eligibles. 34 Managers may also reduce staffing, which represents their largest cost category.
However, reactions may differ between not-for-profit and forprofit NHs. Approximately 75% of all facilities in the US market are considered to be for-profit NHs, 35 and they are assumed to operate as profit maximizers 36 that can be achieved by preferring private-pay and Medicare over Medicaid residents.
Not-for-profit organizations are obliged to serve collective purposes, and they are usually driven by their mission. Nevertheless, they have to break even, and therefore, they have to consider profit in their objectives in addition to welfare and output maximization. 37 In some cases, not-for-profit organizations face the dilemma of entering commercial fields that may conflict with their social mission to overcome financial constraints. In particular in markets where notfor-profit and profit-oriented NHs are forced to compete, it is difficult to distinguish between not-for-profit and for-profit organizations. 38 Figure 1 ).
| Conceptual framework
We hypothesize that the effects on financial performance, struc- 
| Empirical Model
First, we specified the following empirical model to identify the ef- Correlation between the explanatory variables and the residuals was handled using mean differencing. Mean differencing allows one to exploit within-facility variation and to avoid bias arising from unobserved and potentially confounding cross-sectional heterogene- In all estimations, we accounted for the hierarchical structure by nesting NHs within states. Further, we imposed blocks with an autoregressive structure in the covariance matrix at the facility level to account for correlation due to time-repeated measures within the error term. 47 All estimations were performed using SAS ® 9.4, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. NHs have a higher share of comparatively low paid Medicaid residents, while not-for-profit NHs serve more private-pay residents.
| RE SULTS
However, not-for-profit NHs generate lower profits on average than for-profit NHs, but not-for-profit NHs have been closing the profit gap to their for-profit peers in recent years. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 .
The main results are presented in Table 3 . Political control has a significant impact on the financial performance of for-profit NHs, whereas this is not the case with not-for-profit NHs. For-profit NHs gain significantly in revenues by $85 977 (P = 0.0449) every year following a unified Democratic legislature compared to a divided legislature.
Revenues decrease by −$124 940 (P = 0.0424) after the Republicans controlled the legislature. Potential effects on not-for-profit NHs show in the same direction, but are not significant at the 5%-level.
We do not observe a significant change in expenses, but we observe significant effects on operating profits. 
| D ISCUSS I ON
Analyzing the effect of political control in the three decisive policy institutions, that is, the two houses of the legislature and the governorship, provides important insights into how these political institutions shape the provision of long-term care at the facility level. According to our results, political control of the two legislative chambers is more important than holding the governorship.
Whether Republican or Democrat, both parties start immediately implementing their diverging political visions after they obtain the majority in both chambers of the legislature with observable results in the following year. Their political agendas not only significantly differ from each other but also significantly differ from the more moderate political decision making that can be observed during a divided legislature. However, not all facilities are similarly affected. 
TA B L E 2 Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables
Observations (facility-years) 
Unit

TA B L E 2 (Continued)
NHs' quality outcomes. Therefore, the non-significant findings in health outcomes should be considered with care. Staff levels are likely not affected because there is a general shortage in nurses on all levels. Therefore, NHs will not reduce staff levels with a decreasing occupancy and they have difficulties to increase staff levels despite increasing residents.
With our study on political control, we complement studies that analyze the effect of distinct policy initiatives, such as the effect of minimum staffing standards, 50,51 certificate-of-need regulations, 52, 53 and reimbursement changes. 41, 43, 54 In comparison with those studies, we analyze the full range of Republican and Democratic possibilities for policy making and how these affect the NH industry. Although we cannot attribute the effects to specific policy interventions, this approach is not necessarily a disadvantage. We provide a more holistic and balanced overview of the effect of political control, and our empirical model specification is less affected by unobserved confounding. Confounding is often a major limitation in policy intervention analyses because most interventions differ in design, and they are often implemented simultaneously through a whole array of policy measures.
| Unified Republican legislature
We observe a significant reduction in Medicaid residents and a significant increase in private-pay residents following a unified
Republican legislature. This shift in resident composition is more likely to be a result of restrictive Medicaid policies than it is a deliberate decision of a NH to focus on the more lucrative private-pay segment. If it would be a deliberate decision of the NH to substitute residents, one would expect that the effect on not-for-profit NHs would be smaller than on for-profit NHs. The strive for profit maximization may incentivize for-profit NHs to more strongly prefer the private-pay segment in which eligibility, reimbursement rates, and service levels are more freely negotiable compared to not-forprofit NHs that at least partly follow a charitable mission. In addition, choices of NHs are often restricted. Most NHs operate at low capacity which is at 86.1% on average. At these levels, NHs cannot choose between admitting an unattractive Medicaid or a privatepay resident. They rather choose between a Medicaid resident or an empty bed.
We do not observe a significant effect of Republican political control on NHs' expenses. Here, it is likely that two opposing effects occur that are under the control of the facilities. NHs may reduce service levels for Medicaid and invest in more demanding privatepay residents to address the new environment. One may also argue that state mandates are put in place that prevent NHs from reducing service levels for Medicaid beneficiaries or that it is more difficult for NHs to enforce cost reductions than to increase expenses. However, the increase in the private-pay segment does not fully offset the loss in the important Medicaid segment because profits-the residual of revenues and expenses-seem to be negatively affected by
Republican political control.
| Unified Democratic legislature
Revenues One might also argue that boosting NHs' financial performance 55 or providing higher reimbursement 54, 56 leads to better resident outcomes. However, according to our results, political control is not significantly related to resident outcomes. This finding is surprising, as a large number of hospitalizations are considered to be inappropriate or avoidable, 57 and the number of hospitalizations seems to be sensitive to changes in reimbursement policies. 58 However, Medicare pays for hospitalization, while Medicaid is neutral or even leads to savings when a resident is hospitalized.
| For-profit vs not-for-profit nursing homes
According to our data, not-for-profit NHs are less sensitive to political control than are for-profit NHs. The share of private-pay residents in not-for-profit NHs is 29.4%, about 50% higher than in for-profit NHs (19.5%). The higher share of state-regulated Medicaid residents renders for-profit NHs more exposed to political control, while the higher share of high-margin non-regulated private-pay residents provides not-for-profit NHs with more financial flexibility.
This financial flexibility allows NHs to achieve charitable goals and to break even simultaneously. Interestingly, since for-profit and notfor-profit NHs are affected differently by political control, it may be the case that not-for-profit NHs are not becoming like private firms as Weisbrod 38 suggests.
| Gubernatorial power
In the sphere of NH care and Medicaid payment policies, political control matters at the legislative level but-according to our resultsnot at the gubernatorial level. Fundamentally, our finding is consistent with the median voter theorem. 59 Similar to Reed 7 and Leigh, 60 we argue that governors have to behave in a more centrist manner than the legislature because they have to appeal to the median voter of the whole state, while members of the legislature have to appeal to the median voters in their districts. Being more centrist than the legislature, the governor does not foster or inhibit the ambitions of the legislature in implementing partisan long-term care policies.
TA B L E 3 Parameter estimates of unified Republican and Democratic legislatures and interaction effects with for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes 
| Limitations and further research
Our study has several limitations arising from our need for a long data series and the observational nature of our question and ana- Although we believe that we have controlled for most of the confounding factors, an unobserved variable bias may persist. Further research may attempt to control for those time-varying confounding factors using a longer panel or different methods.
Finally, our conceptual model measures the effect of political control of the legislature on NH financial performance, structure, and outcomes. However, the different laws and regulations ultimately causing the changes in the dependent variables are considered a black box. Further research may consider a mediation model where political control influences laws and regulations, especially reimbursement, and laws and regulations passed affect NH financial performance, structure, and outcomes.
| CON CLUS ION
Our findings expand upon the literature analyzing the impact of political control on state policy decisions. By adding to the existing literature analyzing the impact of political control at the aggregate level, such as the state Medicaid budget or tax dollars, we provide insights into the way that political control affects the single facilities that provide the services. Based on our analysis, we can conclude that political control of the two legislative chambers-but not of the governorship-not only impacts aggregate budgets but also effectively shapes the provision of long-term care services in the field. 
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